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Transnational Legal Pluralism

Abstract: This paper draws out the analogies and connections between long‐standing legal
sociological insights into pluralistic legal orders and present concerns with the fragmentation of
law outside of the nation state. Within the nation‐state, the discovery of legal pluralism
inspired a larger contestation of concepts of legal formalism, of the alleged unity of the legal
order and of the hierarchy of norms against the background of a consistently advancing process
of constitutionalization. This research heightened regulators’ sensitivity to blind spots and
exclusionary dynamics in the design of rights, leading inter alia to wide‐ranging efforts to
render more effective access to justice, legal aid and legal representation. Another important
consequence concerned an increased awareness of different levels and sites of norm‐creation
in various societal areas. Much of this is mirrored by today’s quest for a just, democratic and
equitable global legal order, for example in the debate about ‘fragmentation of international
law’ or ‘global administrative law’. But, while the legal pluralism debate largely unfolded in the
context (and contestation) of relatively mature legal orders and institutions, such institutional
frameworks and safeguards are largely absent on the international plane. As a result, the
emergence of numerous norm‐setting agencies, specialized courts and tribunals and regulatory
networks are perceived as obstacles or impediments to the creation of a sound legal order on a
global scale, rather than as inherent traits of an evolving legal order.
In order to grasp the increasingly transterritorial nature of regulatory governance it is necessary
to revisit the arguments in support of legal pluralism and, in particular, the legal pluralist
critique of the association of law with the state. On that basis, it becomes possible to read the
currently dominant narrative of the ‘end of law’ in an era of globalisation in a different light.
Rather than describing the advent of globalisation as an end‐point of legal development, the
transnational perspective seeks to deconstruct the various law‐state associations by
understanding the evolution of law in relation and response to the development of ‘world
society’. The currently lamented lack of democratic accountability, say, in international
economic governance, can then be perceived as a further consequence in a highly
differentiated and de‐territorialized society. The paper thus rejects the attempts by lawyers to
re‐align transnational governance actors with traditional concepts of the state or of civil society
and, instead, contrasts them with various advances in sociology and anthropology with regard
to the evolution of ‘social norms’ and ‘spaces’ of governance and regulation. These perspectives
effectively challenge present attempts to conceptualize a hierarchically structured global legal
order. This article’s proposed concept of ‘transnational legal pluralism’ [TLP] goes beyond Philip
Jessup’s 1956 idea of ‘transnational law’, through which he sought to both complement and
challenge Public and Private International Law. TLP brings together insights from legal sociology
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and legal theory with research on global justice, ethics and regulatory governance to illustrate
the transnational nature of law and regulation, always pushing against the various claims to
legal unity and hierarchy made over time.
Forthcoming in (2010) Vol. 1 No. 2 Transnational Legal Theory, 141‐189.
Keywords: Legal Pluralism, Fragmentation of law, Regulatory Governance, Transnational Law,
Private Governance Regimes, Regulatory Networks, Rough Consensus and Running Code
JEL classification: K 20, K 22, K 33
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Transnational Legal Pluralism
Peer Zumbansen*

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the distinctive features of today’s legal theoretical work on global governance is the
recurring frustration over and problematization of the absence of stable institutions of norm‐
creation and enforcement outside of the nation state. While the discrepancy between the
weight and urgency of border‐crossing regulatory challenges – such as climate change,
migration and security on the one hand and the existing institutional and normative framework,
on the other – arguably lies at the bottom of this malcontent, global governance must address
other concerns as well. One such concern has to do with the ambiguity of the concept and the
term depicting it. ‘Global’ ‘governance’ alludes to two transformations, namely a shift from
government to governance and to a counting of time ‘before’ and ‘after’ globalisation.
Approaching global governance from this starting point, however, carries particular risks of
juxtaposing inadequately depicted states and constellations of legal and political order.
Related narratives are often informed by accounts of globalisation as marking a moment of loss
of something that was there before. As will be discussed in more detail later, this demarcation
of before and after inappropriately idealizes and petrifies the before but also limits the range of
institutional and normative imagination applicable to the after. This has significant
consequences, for example, when we are confronted with the alleged loss of legal ‘unity’,
‘certainty’ or, ‘hierarchy’ in the global arena as opposed to the nation state, which in turn is
celebrated as an ideal space that now has become lost (or, at least, radically undermined or
diminished) and, thus, ill‐suited to the demands of a globalised world. The distinction between
the ‘before’ and the ‘after’ of globalisation also has a tremendous impact on the normative
evaluation of what was and what is to come, something that has become extremely important
for the critique of colonialism and so‐called post‐colonialism1 and which, in turn, has been a
crucial source of critical scholarship in international law.2

*

Professor of Law, Canada Research Chair, Osgoode Hall Law School. 2009‐2010, Visiting Professor University
College Dublin, School of Law. Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca
1

Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA
2002) Preface, x: “Just imagine what the rejection of my past meant. The colonial dispensation had created images
of my past. Barbaric, primitive, tribal, savage, satanic, uncultured, uneducated. It was a past without a history.” In
this vein, see also Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, 2nd
ed. [orig. 2000] (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2007), and Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its
Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1993).
2

Antony Anghie, 'The Evolution of International Law: colonial and postcolonial realities' (2006) 27 Third World
Quarterly 739‐753; Ruth Buchanan, 'Writing Resistance Into International Law' (2008) 10 International Community
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From a different angle, global governance raises serious concerns among critical legal scholars,
who understandably fear the fast emergence and consolidation of an all‐encompassing
regulatory framework that is driven more by alleged needs to ‘react’, to ‘monitor’, to ‘facilitate’
and to ‘moderate’ global activity than by a continued engagement with a political theory of law
in a pluralistic and divided world. Where ‘good governance’ then turns into a label and a meta‐
theoretical justification for ongoing processes of economic globalisation, alternative proposals,
geared towards reneweds critiques of property3 and human rights4 and towards the
development of empowering, pluralistic transnational communities5 and forums,6 face serious
obstacles.
In light of these complexities of overlapping and conflicting accounts, the disciplinary field of
global governance offers an important opportunity to gain new and further insights into the
building blocks of an emerging legal, political and economic order. The struggle with the
absence of ‘world government’ is undeniably a struggle ‐ over the form and legitimacy of – any
– government itself. As such, current inquiries into the role of the state and the nature of legal
regulation are charged with the translation of an extremely rich repository of rights critique,
‘law and society’ scholarship, ‘law and economics’ analysis, and legal anthropology into the
discourses unfolding under the umbrella of an interdisciplinary study of transnational
regulatory regimes. Such a research agenda develops against the background of the ‘anti‐
positivist’ origins of legal pluralism7, which eventually evolved into a highly differentiated and
Law Review 1‐10; Obiora Chinedu Okafor, 'Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory,
Methodology, or Both?' (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 371‐378.
3

Robert L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non‐Coercive State' (1923) 38 Political Science
Quarterly 470‐494; Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring. Law, Distribution and Gender in Market Reform
(The Erik Castrén Institute Monographs on International Law and Human Rights, Kluwer Law International, The
Hague 2002); Fleur Johns, 'Performing Power: The Deal, Corporate Rule, and the Constitution of Global Legal
Order' (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 116‐138

4

Issa G. Shivji, 'Constructing a New Rights Regime: Promises, Problems and Prospects' (1999) 8 Social & Legal
Studies 253‐276; Issa G. Shivji, 'Human Rights and Development: A Fragmented Discourse' in Peer Zumbansen and
Ruth Buchanan (eds), Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and Transitional Justice (Hart Publishing,
Oxford, UK/Portland, OR 2010); Sundhya Pahuja, 'Rights as Regulation: The Integration of Development and
Human Rights' in Bronwyn Morgan (ed) The Intersection of Rights and Regulation (Ashgate, London 2008)
5

Roger Cotterrell, 'Transnational Communities and the Concept of Law' (2008) 21 Ratio Juris 1‐18; Roger Cotterrell,
'Spectres of Transnationalism: Changing Terrains of Sociology of Law' (2009) 36 Journal of Law and Society 481‐500
6

Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 'The World Social Forum and the Global Left' (2008) 36 Politics & Society 247‐270;
David Kennedy, 'Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance' (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 1‐24
7

Richard Ashby Wilson, 'Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and Transnational Law' in Mark
Goodale and Sally Engle Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Global and the Local
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 2006), 345
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empirically driven analysis of co‐existing and overlapping regulatory regimes.8 The emergence
of ‘governance studies’9 and the increasingly influential study of law through a regulatory lens10
testify to an important widening and deepening of the legal analytical apparatus. Seen in this
light, the present obsession with the alleged novelty of a ‘global’ legal and political order has
direct ties to preceding contestations of welfare state governments and their aftermaths in the
last two decades, including a significant functionalisation of regulatory policies and legal
principles.11 Accordingly, much needed inquiries into previous experiences with rights regimes
are fuelled by grave concerns over democratic representation12 but remaintorn between
references to state‐to‐state relations and a concern with global ‘citizens’13, as well as over the
politics of (domestic) hard and (global) soft laws14 and the nature of rights on a global scale.1516
8

Sally Engle Merry, 'Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes' (1992) 21 Annual Review of Anthropology
357‐379; Sally Engle Merry, 'New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law' (2006) 31 Law & Soc
Inquiry 975‐995; Gregory Shaffer and Victoria Nourse, 'Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can A New World Order
Prompt A New Legal Theory?' (2009) 61 Cornell Law Review 61‐137
9

See eg, Scott Burris, Michael Kempa and Clifford Shearing, 'Changes in Governance: A Cross‐Disciplinary Review
of Current Scholarship' (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 1‐66.
10

Colin Scott, 'Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory State' in Jacint Jordana and
David Levi‐Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2004); Colin Scott, 'Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism'
(2010) EUI Working Papers Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Private Regulation Series‐02 http://ucd‐
ie.academia.edu/documents/0093/9406/RSCAS_2010_0007.pdf; see also Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An
Introduction to Law and Regulation. Texts and Materials (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 2007).
11

Orly Lobel, 'The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought'
(2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342‐469; Peer Zumbansen, 'Law After the Welfare State: Formalism,
Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law' (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 769‐805
12

David Held, 'Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective' (2004) 39
Government and Opposition 364‐391; David Held, 'Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reform!' in
David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), Globalization Theory Approaches and Controversies (Polity, London 2007);
Regina Kreide, 'The Ambivalence of Juridification. On Legitimate Governance in the International Context' (2009) 2
Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 18‐34
13

For an insightful discussion, see Rainer Forst, 'Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice' in Thomas
Pogge (ed) Global Justice (Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA 2001).
14

Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, 'In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics' in Walter
Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 2009)
15

Sundhya Pahuja, 'Rights as Regulation: The Integration of Development and Human Rights' in Bronwyn Morgan
(ed) The Intersection of Rights and Regulation (Ashgate, London 2008); Fleur E. Johns, 'Global Governance: An
Heretical History Play' (2004) 4 Global Jurist Advances Art. 3 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=603232), 11, 29, 37: “The
space of global governance, as described in these writings [referencing work by John Coffee Jr., Richard Falk, Anne‐
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Finally, the competing assertions of market regulation, before and since the unfolding of the
global financial and economic crisis that began in 200717, call for a renewed assessment of the
legal nature of markets, long ago scrutinized by Legal Realist scholars18 as well as of the
particular forms of legal and non‐legal regulation that remain at the centre of ‘law and
society’19 scholarship and studies of ‘legal pluralism’.20 What has become increasingly
recognized is the fact that such inquiry cannot remain confined to a discipline or field on its
own: branches of economics as well as a wide range of ‘social sciences’ have been called upon
to contribute to the emergence of a more layered and more differentiated concept of
‘regulatory governance’.21

Marie Slaughter and others, PZ], is a realm aspiring to be one of coherence and predestination. It is a space in
which earthly divisions are to melt away before the final judgment of the market or the universal decrees of
human rights. In this domain, the actions of governments, corporations, laborers, employers, even refugees are
fused into pre‐inscribed patterns of convergence.” See also Joseph Raz, 'Human Rights in the Emerging World
Order' (2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 31‐47.
16

See, for example, Duncan Kennedy, 'The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies' in Wendy Brown and Janet
Halley (eds), Left Legalism/Left Critique (Duke University Press, Durham, NC 2002); see also Conor Gearty, Can
Human Rights Survive? (2005 Hamlyn Lectures) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 2006), in particular ch.
3. Still a very insightful critique is provided by Crawford Brough Macpherson, 'The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice'
(1987) in: Macpherson, The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice, and other Essays The role of state, class and property
in twentieth‐century democracy 1‐20, in particular ch. 2: ‘Problems of Human Rights in the Late Twentieth
Century’.
17

See eg, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall. America, Free Markets and the Sinking of the World Economy (W.W. Norton &
Co., New York 2010), and Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Financial Capitalism (Edizioni Casagrande, Bellinzona,
Switzerland 2010).
18

Robert L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non‐Coercive State' (1923) 38 Political Science
Quarterly 470‐494; Morris R. Cohen, 'Property and Sovereignty' (1927) 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 8‐30
19

Lawrence M. Friedman, 'Coming of Age: Law and Society Enters an Exclusive Club' (2005) Annual Review of Law
and Social Sciences 1‐16

20

Sally Engle Merry, 'Legal Pluralism' (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 869‐901; Harry W. Arthurs, Without the Law:
Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (University of Toronto Press, Toronto
1988); Derek McKee, ‘Review Essay ‐ Context and Commitment: A Pluralist Perspective on the Paradox of Law (On
Melissaris’ Ubiquitous Law)’ (2010) 11 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 573‐584.
21

Oliver E Williamson, The Economics of Governance, Nobel Prize Lecture 2009, available at:
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/williamson‐lecture.html; see also Oliver E.
Williamson, 'The Economics of Governance' (2005) 95 American Economic Review 1‐18; Colin Scott, 'Regulatory
Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism' (2010) EUI Working Papers Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced
Studies,
Private
Regulation
Series‐02
http://ucd‐
ie.academia.edu/documents/0093/9406/RSCAS_2010_0007.pdf; Peer Zumbansen and Gralf‐Peter Calliess, 'Law,
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In light of these preliminary observations, the paper aims to draw out the analogies and
connections between long‐standing legal sociological insights into pluralistic legal orders and
present concerns with the ‘fragmentation’ of law outside of the nation state to show that the
focus on law ‘before’ and ‘after’ globalisation misses the point. In the context of the nation
state and well before the before/after‐globalisation optic took hold, legal pluralism had
contributed to a fundamental contestation of legal formalism and of the alleged unity and
hierarchical structure of the nation state legal order. This research heightened regulators’
sensitivity to blind spots and exclusionary dynamics in the design of rights, leading inter alia to
wide‐ranging efforts to render more effective the access to justice, to legal aid and legal
representation.22 Another important consequence of legal pluralist research concerned an
increased awareness of different levels and sites of norm‐creation23, work that remains among
the central catalysts for a fast‐growing regulatory theory literature in law in present times. The
ideological battles waged over the basis and limits of rights, over redistribution and over
democratic participation naturally cross the boundaries of nation states – in both directions.24
Much of this is mirrored by today’s quest for a just, democratic and equitable global legal order
as reflected, for example, in the debate about the ‘fragmentation of international law’25 or the
aspirations – and limitations – of a ‘global administrative law’.26 But, while the legal pluralism
debate had a strong impact in the context and through the contestation of relatively mature

Economics and Evolutionary Theory: State of the Art and Interdisciplinary Perspectives' in Peer Zumbansen and
Gralf‐Peter Calliess (eds), Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK 2010).
22

Marc Galanter, 'Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change' (1974) 9 Law &
Society Rev 95‐160.
23

See only Robert M. Cover, 'Nomos and Narrative' (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4‐68.

24

Gerald Epstein, 'International Capital Mobility and the Scope for National Management' in Robert Boyer and
Daniel Drache (eds), States Against Markets: the limits of globalization (Routledge, London 1998); Daniela Caruso,
'Private Law and State‐Making in the Age of Globalization' (2006) 39 New York University Journal of International
Law & Politics 1‐74

25

Martti Koskenniemi and Paivi Leino, 'Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties' (2002) 15
Leiden Journal of International Law 553; Andreas Fischer‐Lescano and Gunther Teubner, 'Regime‐Collisions: The
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law' (2004) 25 Michigan J Int'l L 999‐1046

26

Nico Krisch, Benedict Kingsbury and Richard B. Stewart, 'The Emergence of Global Administrative Law' (2005) 68
Law and Contemporary Problems 15; B.S. Chimni, 'Cooption and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative
Law' (2005) IILJ International Law and Justice Working Papers 2005/16 ; Carol Harlow, 'Global Administrative Law:
The Quest for Principles and Values' (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 187‐214; Susan Marks,
'Naming Global Administrative Law' (2006) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 995‐
1001
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legal orders and institutions27, such institutional frameworks and safeguards are largely absent
on the international plane. Accordingly, the emergence of numerous norm‐setting agencies,
specialized courts and tribunals and regulatory networks can be perceived either as obstacles or
impediments to the creation of a sound legal order on a global scale or as inherent traits of an
evolving legal order.28
In order to grasp the increasingly transterritorial nature of regulatory governance it is necessary
to revisit the arguments in support of legal pluralism and, in particular, the legal pluralist
critique of law’s association with the state. On that basis, it becomes possible to read the
currently dominant narrative of the ‘end of law’ in an era of globalisation in a different light.
Rather than describing the advent of globalisation as an end‐point of legal development, a
transnational perspective seeks to deconstruct the various law‐state associations by
understanding the evolution of law in relation and response to the development of ‘world
society’, a society understood as non‐territorially confined, functionally differentiated and
constituted by the co‐evolution of conflicting societal rationalities. The decisive feature of world
society is the impossibility of devising one convincing meta‐theory of political governance.29
Instead, its contours only become apparent through an incessant confrontation of particular,
functionally differentiated rationalities with a concept of society that remains embedded in a
dualist conception of public and private, state and market. On that basis, the lack of democratic
accountability, say, in international economic governance30, can then be perceived as lying
squarely in between the further accentuated evolution of a highly differentiated and de‐
territorialized society on the one hand and a continued quest for (global) justice on the other.
This suggests a certain scepticism towards attempts to realign transnational governance actors
with traditional concepts of the state or of civil society. In contrast, a more promising avenue of
inquiry seems to involve a study of the evolving actors and norms on the basis of advances
made in sociology and anthropology with regard to the evolution of ‘social norms’ and ‘spaces’

27

Sally Falk Moore, 'Law and Social Change: the semi‐autonomous field as an appropriate subject of study' (1973)
7 Law & Society Review 719‐746; John Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and
Unofficial Law 1‐55

28

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Introduction' in Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (eds), Governance in
a Globalizing World (Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 2000)
29

Compare Niklas Luhmann, 'The World Society as a Social System' (1982) 8 International Journal of General
Systems 131‐138, with John W. Meyer and others, 'World Society and the Nation‐State' (1997) 103 American
Journal of Sociology 144‐181.

30

See eg, James Thuo Gathii, 'Third World Approaches to International Economic Governance' in Richard A. Falk,
Balakrishnan Rajagopal and Jacqueline Stevens (eds), International Law and the Future (Routledge Cavendish,
London & New York 2008), and Richard Peet, Unholy Trinity. The IMF, World Bank and WTO (2nd ed.) (Zed Books,
London, UK 2009).
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of governance and regulation31, but also the concept of ‘economic governance’ developed in
the context of the New Institutional Economics’.32
Against this background, this paper seeks to combine a legal sociological perspective with a
legal theoretical one for a critical reconstruction of ‘legal pluralism’ against the background of
the concept of transnational law, with the aim of developing a concept of transnational legal
pluralism. It attempts to build bridges between, on the one hand, the long‐standing
introspection into ‘law and its other’ that has taken place with reference to political institutions
and processes, to the state and a legitimating societal body and, on the other hand, the still less
known and less travelled global space. The concept of transnational legal pluralism to be
developed in this article goes beyond Philip Jessup’s 1956 idea of ‘transnational law’, through
which he sought both to complement and to challenge Public and Private International Law33,
by bringing together insights from legal sociology and legal theory with research on global
justice, ethics and regulatory governance to illustrate (what he coined as) the transnational
nature of law and regulation, always pushing against the various claims to legal unity and
hierarchy made over time. While for Jessup the reference to ‘transnational’ served above all to
highlight the inability of the existing disciplines of both public and private international law to
capture the various border‐crossing regulatory interactions between public and private or
between private parties, the here proposed concept of transnational legal pluralism is foremost
a proposal to conceive of transnational law from a methodological perspective. It is thus no
longer concerned with a quest for a legal field, which could embrace and regulate the just
described border‐crossing nature of hybrid regulatory interaction. Instead, the term
transnational is meant here to identify a methodological space in which to make sense of the
conditions that shape references to law or non‐law in functionally highly differentiated
contexts.

31

See in particular Sally Engle Merry, 'New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law' (2006) 31 Law
& Soc Inquiry 975‐995; Saskia Sassen, 'The State and Globalization' in Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (eds),
Governance in a Globalizing World (Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 2000); Saskia Sassen, Territory ‐
Authority ‐ Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ/Oxford, UK
2006), and Saskia Sassen, 'The Places and Spaces of the Global: An Expanded Analytic Terrain' in David Held and
Anthony McGrew (eds), Globalization Theory Approaches and Controversies (Polity, London 2007). See also
Annelise Riles, 'Comparative Law and Socio‐Legal Studies' in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds),
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2006).
32

33

See only Oliver E. Williamson, 'The Economics of Governance' (2005) 95 American Economic Review 1‐18.

Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (Storrs Lectures in Jurisprudence at Yale Law School, Yale University Press,
New Haven 1956); Wolfgang Friedmann, Louis Henkin and Oliver Lissitzyn (eds), Transnational Law in a Changing
Society. Essays in the Honor of Philip C. Jessup (Columbia University Press, New York 1972); Christian Tietje, Alan
Brouder and Karsten Nowrot, Philip C. Jessup's Transnational Law Revisited (Essays in Transnational Law
No.50/2006) (Essays in Transnational Law No50/2006, Halle); Peer Zumbansen, 'Transnational Law' in Jan Smits
(ed) Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, 2006)
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These contexts ‐‐ such as financial markets34, online sales contracts35 or labour regulations in
and around multinational enterprises36 ‐‐ are characterised by a complex amalgamation of
‘hard’ and ‘soft’, direct and indirect norms that no longer fit under the semantic umbrella of
existing disciplinary fields such as labour law or corporate law. As a result, not only have the
scope and content of such fields come under pressure; more importantly, the intersection of
different forms of ‘regulatory governance’ with regard to such contexts must now be assessed
through a methodological lens. From this perspective, then, the first insight is into the distinctly
interdisciplinary nature of the regulation that marks a particular context. We see here an
intricate co‐existence, overlap and often competition between legal and, say, economic rules.37
The further insight, of crucial importance from a legal theory point of view, is into the status of
law in this mixed regulatory landscape, and it is here where a concept of transnational legal
pluralism must reach beyond Jessup’s identification of a particular exhaustion of existing
disciplinary fields to depict border‐crossing, hybrid interaction. The central point of the
transnational perspective embraced here is that, despite an emerging consensus regarding the
co‐existence of legal and ‘other’ forms of regulation, an observation informed above all by the
distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions in the context of New Institutional
Economics38, we are still at a loss as to how to distinguish between a legal and a non‐legal form
of regulation. As long as the distinction is based on the reference to a particular authority,
which alone is entrusted with the production of legal rules – commonly understood to be the
state – the distinction will result in an identification of ‘formal’ institutions with ‘law’ and the
state, while almost every other norm apt to govern or guide human behaviour can only be
considered as an ‘informal’. What is left outside of this demarcation is the question of ‘What is
at stake?’ in the choice between a legal and an alternative form of regulation.

34

Saskia Sassen, 'The Embeddedness of Electronic Markets: The Case of Global Capital Markets' in Karin Knorr
Cetina and Alex Preda (eds), The Sociology of Financial Markets (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK/New York, NY
2005)

35

Gralf‐Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private
Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, UK 2010) 153‐180
36

Harry Arthurs, 'Corporate Self‐Regulation: Political Economy, State Regulation and Reflexive Labour Law' in Brian
Bercusson and Cynthia Estlund (eds), Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalisation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, UK
& Portland, OR 2008)
37

For an illustration, see Lisa Bernstein, 'Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions' (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724‐1790, and Gillian K. Hadfield and Eric
Talley, 'On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law' (2006) 22 J Law, Econ & Org 414‐441, for an extensive
discussion see Calliess and Zumbansen, Rough Consensus, supra, 80, 87‐96.
38

See Douglass C. North, 'Institutions' (1991) 5 J Econ Persp 97‐112, and Oliver E. Williamson, 'The New
Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead' (2000) 38 Journal of Economic Literature 595‐613.
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For lawyers, this remains extremely unsatisfactory, because the distinction can only be
sustained in blunt negation of the far‐reaching legal pluralist insights into the many forms of
legal normative orders. As a result, because lawyers are bound to remain troubled by the
economists’ demarcation of formal versus informal, an important step towards a more
adequate assessment of the regulatory pluralism characterizing the mentioned contexts is to
put a central emphasis on how the distinction between law and non‐law is in fact made. It is
here where lawyers are likely to unfold different set of distinctions than that which has been
informing the economist’s study of institutions. While the economist is herself pushing ever
deeper into the ‘institutional diversity’ which marks complex regulatory and self‐regulatory
contexts39, the gained insights remain confined to an (admittedly better) understanding of the
various rules, norms and behaviour‐governing institutions present in such contexts. Meanwhile,
the process through which the distinction between the legal and a non‐legal character of any
such institution is made remains opaque, as long as the distinction is loosely attached to
references to state‐based or non‐state‐based norm‐making authorities. Against the background
of legal pluralist insights into the different forms of legal regulation, based on which formal
legal systems were being put to the test in terms of their legitimacy, openness to change and
their access to justice40, such a narrow interpretation of law cannot stand.
Central to the project of transnational legal pluralism are, thus, the following two
methodological premises. The first concerns the inquiry into the elements that inform the
distinction between law and non‐law in any given regulatory context. Precisely because
‘alternatives’ to legal regulation have become impressingly self‐assured in asserting their
interpretive and governing grip on complex constellations41, it is even more important to ask
whether there is in fact any role left for law and, in particular, for law’s operation to introduce
the distinction between legal and illegal with regard to a social context.42 The role of law, as will
be developed in more detail below, remains in facilitating and structuring the space in which
trade‐offs between legal and non‐legal regulations occur. This structuring of law is bound to
function with references to the learned contexts and institutional frameworks associated with
law in a given place at a given time, which explains a certain preoccupation among contintental

39

Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2005); Elinor
Ostrom, 'Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis' (2007) 3
Journal of Institutional Economics 239‐264
40

David Trubek, 'Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development' (1972) 82 Yale
Law Journal 1‐50; John Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law
1‐55; Günter Frankenberg, 'Why Care? ‐ The Trouble with Social Rights' (1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 1365‐1390
41

For a critical discussion, see only David Charny, 'Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: 'Norms' in Contractual
Relationships' (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1841‐1858.
42

Niklas Luhmann, 'Law as a Social System' (1989) 83 Northwestern University Law Review 136‐150
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European lawyers with the allegedly central role of the ‘state’ in the creation and enforcement
of legal rules. At the same time, the comparative assessment of the binding or mandatory
character of law, even in areas of intense market regulation and self‐regulation such as
corporate law, already reveals striking differences in the perception of what is and is not
necessary in order to achieve an adequate level of ordered conduct.43
The second methodological premise concerns the transnational dimension in the legal pluralist
analysis, which is proposed here. ‘Transnational’ demarcates not a territorially defined and
demarcated space, across the boundaries of which regulations are seen to be either successful
or unsuccessful in governing or prescribing behaviour. Rather, the term depicts the space in
which the legal pluralist analysis of legal and non‐legal regulation occurs. It makes reference to
the space that is left empty between conceptualizations of a legal order from either a ‘national’
or ‘international’ perspective. The term transnational is closely connected to the sociological
model of the ‘world society’, a term that radicalizes the idea of functional differentiation and
traces communications (in law, economics, religion, politics) primarily with reference to the
particular rationalities of such systems. ‘Primarily’, because any system‐theoretical assessment
is likely to continue, for some time to come, to incorporate references to the ‘context’ in which
systematic communications occur. From the vantage point of much of Western legal theory,
this context is predominantly the state and, more particularly, the nation state. However, from
the perspective of transnational legal pluralism, while this context may still be referenced
merely to better trace the evolution of a particular system over time, it does not in itself explain
or capture a particular system. In other words, the ‘transnational’ element in transnational legal
pluralism seeks to capture this transition process in legal theory from a state‐based depiction
and interpretation of legal norms to a conceptualization of legal norm creation that unfolds
according to principles of functional differentiation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section (2.) revisits the legal pluralist
insights into what is a paradoxical relation between law and non‐law. Against this background,
the paper traces the emergence of border‐crossing regulatory regimes as a challenge to state‐
oriented legal reasoning (3.) before illustrating the parallels between the impasses of legal
theorising about ‘global’ or ‘transnational’ governance with those that marked the evolution
ofthe study of law in the nation‐ state. Section 4 revisits the frequently asked question whether
globalisation marks the end of law: attempting a negative answer (‘law is dead – long live law!’),
this section proposes to read the emergence of ‘transnational law’ not as the advent of a ‘new’
field – similar to the way that, say, environmental law or internet law were once considered
novel fields only relatively recently. Instead, as pointed out above, the central assumption is
43

Compare Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law (Brown & Little, Boston 1986) with Herbert Wiedemann,
Gesellschaftsrecht, Bd. I (C.H.Beck, München 1980); for a brillant discussion of the different approaches, see
Friedrich Kübler, 'The Impact of Equity Markets on Business Organization: Some Comparative Observations
Regarding Differences in the Evolution of Corporate Structures' (2001) 2 European Business Organization Law
Review [EBOR] 669‐683 and Friedrich Kübler, 'A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?' (2005) 11 Colum J
Eur L 219‐240
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that transnational law constitutes a methodological perspective, or paradigm shift in legal
theory – an attempt to bridge the experience of legal pluralism in the nation state with that of
the functionally differentiated world society, that Jessup still sought to capture with reference
to an emerging transnational space. Section 5 pursues this argument and applies it to the initial
paradox between law and non‐law. Transnational law can now be understood as a lens through
which to perceive the argumentative parallels between the impasses, roadblocks and
‘impossibilities’ of law that recur both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the nation state. As the borders
of the state are reconstructed as historically contingent reference points for the evolution of
legal reasoning, transnational law becomes the legal theoretical reconstruction of law/non‐law
in the world society. The concluding section (6) sets out the framework of transnational legal
pluralism.

II. LAW AND ITS OTHER
Today, many regulatory areas can only be understood as instantiations of global norm‐creation.
Supply chains that tie regional and global markets together44, commercial arbitration45, food
safety and food quality standardisation regimes46, internet governance47, but also

44

Francis Snyder, 'Global Economic Networks and Global Legal Pluralism' in George A. Bermann, Matthias
Herdegen and Peter L. Lindseth (eds), Transatlantic Regulatory Co‐operation (Oxford University Press, Oxford/New
York 2000); Francis Snyder, 'Economic Globalisation and the Law in the 21st Century' in Austin Sarat (ed) The
Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Blackwell, New York & Oxford 2004).
45

Clive M. Schmitthoff, 'The New Sources of the Law of International Trade' (1963) 15 International Social Science
Journal 259‐264; Filip De Ly, 'Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalisation and International Self‐Regulation'
in Volkmar Gessner, Richard P. Appelbaum and William F. Felstiner (eds), Rules and Networks The Legal Culture of
Global Business Transactions (Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, OR 2001).

46

Patrycja Dabrowska, 'Risk, Precaution and the Internal Market: Who Won the Day in the Recent Monsanto
Judgement of ECJ on GM foods' (2004) 5 German Law Journal 151‐166; Dayna Nadine Scott, 'Nature/Culture Clash:
The
Transnational
Trade
in
GMOs'
(2005)
Global
Law
Working
Paper
Series
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/GLWP_0605.htm; Antonia Eliason, 'Science versus Law in WTO Jurisprudence: The
(Mis)Interpretation of the Scientific Process and the (In)sufficiency of Scientific Evidence in Ec‐Biotech' (2009) 41
New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 341‐406.
47

David D. Clark, 'A Cloudy Crystal Ball: Visions of the Future' (1992) Plenary Presentation at 24th meeting of the
Internet
Engineering
Task
Force,
Cambridge,
Massachusetts,
13‐17
July
1992
(http://ietf20.isoc.org/videos/future_ietf_92.pdf); Christoph Engel, 'The Role of Law in the Governance of the
Internet' (2002) <http://www.mpp‐rdg.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2002_13.pdf> accessed ; Jack Goldsmith, 'The Internet,
Conflicts of Regulation and International Harmonisation' in Christoph Engel and Kenneth H. Keller (eds),
Governance of Global Networks in the Light of Differing Local Values (Nomos, Baden‐Baden 2000); Jochen von
Bernstorff, 'The Structural Limitations of Network Governance: ICANN as a Case in Point' in Gunther Teubner,
Christian Joerges and Inger‐Johanne Sand (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing,
Oxford, UK & Portland, OR 2004).
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environmental protection48, crime49 and terrorism50 are key examples of fast expanding spaces
of individual, organizational and regulatory activity that evolve with little regard for
jurisdictional boundaries but, instead, appear to develop according to functional imperatives.
Similarly, fields such as corporate, insolvency and even labour law that had long been
understood as embedded in historically evolved political and regulatory economies51, today
display a distinctly de‐nationalised character52, which we should approach from the distinct
methodological perspective indicated above. Constituted through a complex overlapping of
different national, international, public and private norm‐creation processes, these fields
underscore the conundrical nature of a proliferating and expanding global regulatory space: in
response, state‐based responses that draw on architectures of normative hierarchy, separation

48

Jutta Brunnée, 'Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability Regimes as Tools for Environmental
Protection' (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 351‐367; Oren Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and
Global Legal Pluralism. Rethinking the Trade and Environment Conflict (International Studies in Private Law Theory,
Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, OR 2004); Russell Miller and Rebecca Bratspies (eds), Transboundary Harm:
Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (Transboundary Harm: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006); Andrew P. Morriss and Roger E. Meiners, 'Borders and the
Environment' (2009) 39 Environmental Law 141‐192.
49

Tomer Broude and Doron Teichman, 'Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The Political Economy of Globalized
Criminal Activity' (2009) 62 Vanderbilt Law Review 795‐848.

50

Ulrich Beck, 'Living in the world risk society' (2006) 35 Economy and Society 329‐345; Ulrich Beck, 'Critical Theory
of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision' (2009) 16 Constellations 3‐22; Ulrich Beck, World at Risk [orig.
German "Weltrisikogesellschaft" (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp); Ciaran Cronin, transl.] (polity, Cambridge, UK & Malden,
MA (U.S.A.) 2009).
51

See, eg: Sigurt Vitols, 'Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK' in Peter A. Hall and
David Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford
University Press, Oxford/New York 2001), and Klaus J. Hopt, 'Common Principles of Corporate Governance in
Europe?' in Joseph A. McCahery and others (eds), Corporate Governance Regimes Convergence and Diversity
(Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2002).
52

Harry Arthurs and Claire Mummé, 'From Governance to Political Economy: Insights from a Study of Relations
between Corporations and Workers' (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 439‐470; Jennifer Gordon, 'Transnational
Labor Citizenship' (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 503‐587; Peer Zumbansen, ''New Governance' in
European Corporate Governance Regulation as Transnational Legal Pluralism' (2009) 15 European Law Journal 246‐
276 [available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128145]; Horst Eidenmüller, 'Recht als Produkt' (2009) 64
Juristenzeitung [JZ] 641‐653.
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of powers and unity of law53 are likely to fall short of grasping the nature of the evolving
transnational normative order.54
In their search for appropriate labels, concepts and instruments for this regulatory space
lawyers have long been forming alliances with scholars in a wide range of social sciences
including sociology, political science, economics or geography. 55 Such interdisciplinary
collaboration in practice and methodology is anything but new to law and legal theory: building
as it does on early beginnings made by social scientists that emphasised the importance of
social facts and increasingly incorporated empirical findings56, the study of law has for the
longest time been carried out in close proximity and in the constant shadow of social studies.57
The legal sociological projects at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century58 can
53

For an inspiring discussion, see Klaus Günther, 'Legal Pluralism or uniform concept of law?' (2008) 5 no
foundations [NoFo] 5‐21; Florian F. Hoffmann, 'In Quite a State: Trials and Tribulations of an Old Concept in New
Times' in Russell A. Miller and Rebecca Bratspies (eds), Progress in International Law (Martin Nijhoff, The Hague
2008); William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL 2000).
54

Oren Perez, 'Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of
Transnational Law' (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 25‐64; Peer Zumbansen, 'Transnational Law' in
Jan Smits (ed) Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, 2006); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 'Transnational
Spaces: Norms and Legitimacy' (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 479‐490; Alec Stone Sweet,
'Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes' (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
621‐645; Craig M. Scott, ''Transnational Law' as Proto‐Concept: Three Conceptions' (2009) 10 German Law Journal
859‐876.
55

Rebecca Bratspies, 'Regulatory Trust' (2009) 51 Arizona Law Review 575‐631; see the contributions to Edward
Balleisen and David Moss (eds), Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK 2009).

56

Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society [1767] (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995);
Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society [1893; transl. by W.D. Halls] (Free Press, New York 1984).

57

Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law. Its connection with the early history of society, and its relation to modern
ideas (John Murray, London 1861); Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society [Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,
orig. German 1887, transl. Ch. P. Loomis, Michigan State University Press, 1957] (Transaction Publishers, New
Brunswick, NJ 1988); Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society (transl. from the German Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft, 2nd ed., 1925, by E.Shils and M.Rheinstein, edited/annotated by M.Rheinstein) (Simon Schuster, New
York 1967).
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Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society [1893; transl. by W.D. Halls] (Free Press, New York 1984); Max
Weber, On Law in Economy and Society (transl. from the German Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2nd ed., 1925, by
E.Shils and M.Rheinstein, edited/annotated by M.Rheinstein) (Simon Schuster, New York 1967); Eugen Ehrlich,
Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (orig. published in German as Grundlegung der Soziologie des
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today be seen as eminent precursors for a presently further intensifying study of the
institutional foundations of legal systems in a constellation marked by the erosion of
boundaries between domestic legal orders and the continuing contestation of the normative‐
conceptual foundations of the Rule of Law as well as the welfare state and its ambiguous
aftermath.59 The Legal Realist attack on formalism60, the post‐War natural law/legal positivism
debate61, the emergence of a particular strand of legal pluralism in the wake of post‐
colonialism62, the rise of ‘law & society’ – both from the left63 and from the right64 – as well as
the critique of juridification65 have since given way to a cacophonic contestation of the merits
and limits of ‘law’s knowledge’, its evolving nature and role.66
59

David Trubek, 'Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development' (1972) 82 Yale
Law Journal 1‐50; Gunther Teubner (ed), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New
York 1986).
60

See, eg: Oliver Wendell Jr. Holmes, 'The Path of the Law' (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, and Felix Cohen,
'Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach' (1935) 35 Columbia Law Review 809‐849; Duncan
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought (1975) (Beard Books, Cambridge, MA 2006); a very
worthwhile discussion and analysis with a stunning treatment of the literature is provided by Neil Duxbury,
Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995).
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Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream' (1977) 11 Georgia Law Review 969‐989;
Stanley L. Paulson, 'On the Background and Significance of Gustav Radbruch's Post‐War Papers' (2006) 26 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 17‐40.
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Sally Falk Moore, 'Law and Social Change: the semi‐autonomous field as an appropriate subject of study' (1973)
7 Law & Society Review 719‐746; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 'Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern
Conception of Law' (1987) 14 Journal of Law & Society 279; Sally Engle Merry, 'Legal Pluralism' (1988) 22 Law &
Society Review 869‐901.
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Seen in this light, the search for the ‘nature of law’ has always been carried out with the
pretentious assumption that it is or must be different, that law is – or, in the end can be –
different from religion, morality, and economics.67 But the short twentieth century has left this
idea of law battered and torn, scarred and violated.68 Any attempt, then, to resurrect this
assumption must either be perceived as naïve or as incredulously courageous. Law as a means
of oppression, of corruption and domination, or law as a promise of hope, as an instrument of
liberation and emancipation? Its schizophrenic character is owed to its paradoxical
foundation69, the impossibility of its legitimate creation out of a void70, out of one or more acts
of violence.71 Historically, as law differentiates and emancipates itself from politics, economics,
religion, not in order to ‘rise above’ but, rather, to immerse and embrace and to juridify society
in its inexhaustible complexity72, it threatens either to suffer the fate of Icarus or to evaporate
into thin air. Its immodest, impossible claim must be to be outside of society (politics,
economics, religion), but at the same time to be (the law of) society.73 That law can only be
understood in relation to that which it wishes to distinguish and offset itself from, ought to be
the starting point for understanding the nature of law, not an earth‐shattering revelation after
a seminar in deconstruction. Law’s other is, thus, deeply inherent to any program of law and in
law’s lurking denial, ridiculisation and (self‐) destruction.
67

See already Oliver Wendell Jr. Holmes, 'The Path of the Law' (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457.
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Reinhart Koselleck, 'Geschichte, Recht und Gerechtigkeit (1986)' (2000) Frankfurt: Suhrkamp ders, Zeitschichten
Studien zur Historik 336‐358; Upendra Baxi, The Death of Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford
and New York 2005).
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Gunther Teubner, 'How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law' (1989) 23 Law & Society
Review 727‐758; Gunther Teubner, 'Dealing With Paradoxes: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter' in Oren Perez and
Gunther Teubner (eds), Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in Law (Hart Publishing, Portland, OR/Oxford, UK 2006)
70

Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the concept of sovereignty [1922] (transl. George Schwab)
(Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1986)
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Walter Benjamin, 'The Critique of Violence [Zur Kritik der Gewalt, Edmund Jephcott trans.]' in Peter Dementz
(ed) Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (Schocken, New York City 1978); Jacques Derrida,
'Force of law' (1990) 11 Cardozo Law Review 919‐1045; for an excellent discussion and homage, see Petra Gehring,
'Force and “Mystical Foundation” of Law: How Jacques Derrida Addresses Legal Discourse' (2005) 6 German Law
Journal 151‐169, and the contributions to the same issue (edited by Cornelia Vismann & Florian Hoffmann).
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Table 1: Definitions of Law
1 Law as institutionalised system of rule enforcement
2 Law as a means of stabilizing expectations
3 Law as means of oppression
4 Law as hope
5 Law as parasite – without method, heart, or soul …?
The difficulty in understanding law has to be seen against the background of a blurring of
boundaries between ‘law’ and ‘society’.74 As pointed out by Roger Cotterrell, ‘[l]aw constitutes
society in so far as it is, itself, an aspect of society, a framework and an expression of
understandings that enable society to exist. A sociological perspective on legal ideas is
necessary to recognise and analyse the intellectual and moral power of law in this respect.’75
Understanding law, then, as a ‘social phenomenon’76, Cotterrell observes that the distinction
between law and society does indeed blur: the internal/external distinction is ‘replaced by a
conception of partial, relatively narrow or specialised participant perspectives on (and in) law,
confronting and being confronted by, penetrating, illuminating, and being penetrated and
illuminated by, broader, more inclusive perspectives on (and in) law as a social phenomenon.’77
He rightly posits that the ‘[s]ociological interpretation of legal ideas is not a particular,
specialized way of approaching law, merely co‐existing with other kinds of understanding.
Sociology of law in this particular context is a transdisciplinary enterprise and aspiration to
broaden understanding of law as a social phenomenon.’78 Such a perspective on law must be
understood as an attempt to respond to law’s own lack of methodology: ‘Law does not have a
‘methodology of its own’ and borrows methodologies from any discipline that can supply

74

Roger Cotterrell, 'Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?' (1998) 25 Journal of Law & Society 171‐
192, 176.
75

Cotterrell, 1998, 182.

76

Cotterrell, 1998, 187: ‘Sociological interpretation of legal ideas is not a particular, specialized way of approaching
law, merely co‐existing with other kinds of understanding. Sociology of law in this particular context is a
transdisciplinary enterprise and aspiration to broaden understanding of law as a social phenomenon.’
77

Cotterrell, 1998, 188.

78

Cotterell, 1998, 187.
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them.’79 He concludes that a sociological reflection on legal ideas would be to reflect
‘methodologically law’s own fragmentary varied methodological characteristics’.80

III. THE TRANSNATIONALISATION OF LEGAL GOVERNANCE
A. LAW’S UTOPIA
As the shifting of our analytical focus beyond the boundaries of the nation state has been
providing the stage for the study of law in the recent past81, the here proposed framework of
transnational legal pluralism82 seeks to capture the methodological challenge arising for law
and social theory to make sense of the emerging normative order of the world society. In
situating this concept in dialogue with theoretical approaches regarding ‘transnational law’83,
‘transnational commercial law’84, ‘global law’85, ‘law and globalisation’86, ‘transnational

79
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82
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Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, UK 2010) (2010), above, ch. 2.
83
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Law Journal 859‐876.
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spaces’87 and ‘communities’88, ‘global legal pluralism’89, ‘hard versus soft law’90, ‘law and social
norms’91 or, ‘law as product’92, the conceptual boundaries of the here pursued approach are
constantly relativised and challenged by these parallel endeavours.
Comparative and Transnational Law Program at Osgoode Hall Law School' (2005) 23 Penn State International Law
Review 757‐773.
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Importantly, this multi‐trajectory evolution of legal theory can be studied as a process of law’s
transnationalisation. Despite its prima facie appearance as being relevant exclusively within the
nation state’s framework of legal ordering, the just alluded‐to scholarly projects in legal
sociology and legal theory as well as in anthropology and philosophy of law are reflective of the
changing environment of legal systems. This transformation is foremost perceived as one of
eroding boundaries, boundaries between form and substance93 or between public and private94
(‘states’ and ‘markets’95), but is at its core concerned with the contestation, deconstruction and
relativisation of the boundaries between law and non‐law.96 At the height of the regulatory
state with its climactical belief in juridification and in law as social engineering97, law stares into
the abyss of its own demise and potential irrelevance, and it is from this vantage point that law
must be rethought and reasserted as social science, as one among other conceptual approaches
to the study of the regulation of modern societies.
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Only against this background is it understandable that we are bound to engage in studies of
historical forms of legal/non‐legal regulation in an ironic/paradoxical sense of law. In other
words, references to ‘legal’ regulation are used in an aspiringly ‘water tight’ sense in order to
demarcate one form of regulation from an alternative form of, say, economic regulation. At the
same time, the reference to ‘legal’ regulation is of course based on the premise that its legal
character can only be thought of as paradoxical, as a rejection of something opposite that
needs to remain present in order for the other part to make any sense. The paradoxical co‐
existence of legal and non‐legal, then, captures the above‐described potentials of law (as
oppressor or emancipator), something that history most often records in alternations. Craig
Scott has likened the conceptual analysis (concerning the term ‘transnational law’) to an ‘ironic
interactive space between keeping faith and breaking faith. Often enough, this will involve
digging into a mixture of inchoateness and inconsistencies in the practice or tradition and
coming to grips with the epistemological pluralism of the field.’98
In the concert of different approaches to the regulation of modern society, those fields that
seem to escape a clear association with either or regulatory approach, – such as lex mercatoria
– begin to play a crucial role in the contemporary assessment of law’s role in society, precisely
because they challenge our understandings of the nature of legal regulation in fundamental
ways.99 Well beyond the issue‐concerned analysis of the role and place of lex mercatoria in the
still evolving field of transnational commercial law100, it became and to a certain degree
remains101 a case in point of a larger critical and legal‐sociological inquiry into the possibilities
and forms of, as well as into, the scope of legal regulation. Over the last two decades then, the
discussion of lex mercatoria, of its historical origins, its nature and scope has always also been
an attempt to address the challenge of law by its ‘other’, by that which might either never

98
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become ‘law’ or is (for various reasons) not yet recognised as law, most likely because lex
mercatoria is presented as resulting from private norm‐creation and administration and which
the legal order observes as an exception or, a threat.102 Against the background of the fast
intensifying interdisciplinary theoretisations of comparative law and legal pluralism103, the lex
mercatoria debate must, too, foremost be understood as a methodological challenge asking us
to reflect on the possibility—but also the politics—of ‘law’, which can be but need not to be
state‐originating, which can be but need not to be privately created or which in fact results
from a complex interaction between official and unofficial norm‐creation. It is here where the
real challenge of lex mercatoria as example for the evolution of an ‘autonomous’ transnational
legal regime104 becomes most obvious. Lex mercatoria offers a good insight into the complexity
of the concept of transnational law, precisely because of its multi‐layered and hybrid nature, in
particular as regards the interpenetration of public and private models of norm creation and
norm enforcement in this area.
In the absence of world government, attempts to demarcate a legal system adequate to the
‘post‐national constellation’105 feature, above all, a deep‐running anxiety in the face of a
perceived lack of unity, coherence and institutional and normative hierarchy.106 The procedural
and substantive architectures of fast‐emerging global regulatory regimes107 raise questions that
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go to the heart of present legal‐theoretical attempts to make sense of ‘global governance’ and
that many still continue to address through the lens of the state.108 These questions arise,
notably, around the ‘politics of private law making’109 and as such concern primarily the
constitutional dimensions of private ordering, that is, issues of accountability, legitimacy and
democratic control.110 As increasingly specialised, functionally differentiated problem areas and
spheres of human and institutional conduct evolve in response to a combination of external
impulses and their own particular logics111, the law governing these constellations becomes
deeply entwined in these complex, layered constitutions.112 The heterarchical and network
108
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dimensions of this functionalist evolution of law113 stands in stark contrast to the image of law
as extending its regulatory grasp downward from the tip of a hierarchical pyramid into society:
functionally differentiated law is forced to constantly embrace evolving institutional
permutations114 that prove infinitely more complex and heterarchical than even institutional
economics would have us believe.115 Like a veil, law lays itself onto the surfaces of the shifting
institutional body, and through its semi‐transparent, highly lacerable material it makes visible,
and sensitizes the observer, to the anatomy of the evolving torso, its muscles, bones, joints,
strains, injuries and lesions.116

B. DEFINING LAW
This image of law captures the functionalist attack on the keenly guarded bastion of legal
formalism at the end of the 19th century117 as much as the horror vacui that eventually caught
up with the process of destruction as legal scholars immersed themselves in empirical
foundations of law, only to realise that the edifice of law began to dissolve before their very
eyes.118 The search for law in the face of its fall from unifying triumph into evaporation,
helplessness, abuse and abolition119 inspired the post‐WW II autopsy of positivist and natural
113
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law theories of law120 that eventually gave way to a radical opening of legal theory and doctrine
to the diversity of existing social ordering systems.121 From this perspective, the evolution of
law as a regulatory tool in the latter half of the 20th century provides ample opportunities to
reflect on the way in which law has been asserting itself as a reformist, emancipatory,
empowering tool on the one hand122, and as a deeply violent, usurping, hegemonising force on
the other. Indeed, its conflictual nature cannot be imagined without that which threatens to
consume and suffocate it. The sobering fate of social‐reformist legal theories in the aftermath
of the regulatory welfare state123 and, in particular, their embrace of the functionalist
enactment of the moderating or ‘enabling state’ at the end of the century124 should caution us
against putting too much hope in law as a weapon, voice or as a tool of resistance. The turn and
transformation of responsive125 and reflexive126 law programs in highly mature constitutional
cultures into flexible regulatory programs that accompanied (and accommodated) a growing
distrust in state regulation and political‐reformist legal theory in the name of efficiency127 and
‘good governance’ present a formidable challenge to the post‐Welfare state depictions of
‘alternatives to law’.128 At the end of the 20th century, the grand narratives of social order and
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progress carry the stain of Eurocentrism and hegemony129, and the fate of law becomes fully
caught up in this maelstrom.130 Its claim for authenticity becomes a matter of radical
contestation as law’s aspiration to rule, guide, direct and control is challenged by a fast
proliferating host of sites of normative orders.131
Where does the progression of legal definitions in Table 1 leave us? Does the contradictory
nature of the first four definitions leave the fifth as the only viable one?
Obviously, law’s self‐destruction began before globalisation.132 Globalisation, as alluded to in
the introduction to this article, can provide a label to depict what should be seen as a further
stage of reflection on the relationship between law and its other rather than as an endpoint of
the possibility of law. The predominance of law’s institutionalisation in the Western nation
state during the 19th and 20th centuries not only casts a long shadow over our present attempts
to imagine law, but it also is bound to make us blind to other, alternative approaches to
political legitimacy and legal order.133 While the challenge of law in, or in relation to, the 20th
century welfare state is its functional diffusion and normative evaporation, that of the ‘new
developmental state’ is a radical challenge to presuppositions regarding the role of the state or
the meaning of public and private.134 To be sure, this temporalisation (‘after’ globalisation)
indicates a paradigm shift, a conclusion and abdication of a dominant concept, rather than
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demarcating a historical development of an institutional framework that would
comprehensively replace the preceding models of the state and modes of legal thinking.135
Table 2: The Law and the State
MODEL of STATE

Rule of Law

Social State /
Welfare State

MODEL of LAW
LEGAL METHOD

Formal
Deduction

Substantive
Balancing

Enabling State,
Moderator State,
Supervision State /
Civil Society,
Risk Society,
World Society
Procedural
Experimenting

The importance of this taxonomy of models of state, models of law and legal method lies in its
promise of providing us with a tableau of law’s evolution at least since the late 18th century into
the present. But, as noted, the implied idea of progress or, even of historical evolution is
treacherous. While such historiography would allow us to trace the construction of conceptual
frameworks, in our case the association of (changing) law with the (changing) state, it
nevertheless runs the risk of mistakenly exaggerating that very nexus between law and the
state. That is where the third column in Table 2 becomes central: following a dialectical logic, it
should here provide for the negation of thesis (formal law) and antithesis (substantive law). Yet,
what we see is the diffusion of categorical boundaries that we used to refer to in order to
distinguish between different models of state and different models of law. Western legal
theory, for much of the 20th century, has occupied itself with the impossibility of distinguishing
between ‘public’ and ‘private’ as a manifestation of the paradoxical foundation of law’s
legitimacy with reference to the separation of the state and the market, of politics and
economics.136 Yet, it is this irresolvable tension between the public and the private137 that
winds like a red thread through the evolution of models of state and law. The ‘present’ ‐ which
135
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of course is only perceived as such today from our particular viewpoint, but is meant as the
always inherent potentiality of state and society in the evolution of each ideal type of the state,
and which is depicted in the third column ‐‐ might in the ‘future’ be revealed as the not‐yet, as
an immodest pretension of a stage of closure. But, that we don’t know. For now, it signifies a
moment of inability. The third column captures the impossibility of adequately rendering the
present model of state. It gives expression to the inaptitude of applying categories of formal or
substantive law to the proliferating sources and regulatory regimes of rule generation that
apply to myriad social practices.
What this table tries to capture, then, is the association of a particular model of law (formal,
substantive, procedural) and of legal methodology (deduction, balancing, experimenting) with a
particular model of the state. This association is reflective of the tendency to imagine law in
correlation with a historically evolving model of the state, for which we have in the West ‐
through the course of the twentieth century ‐ been crafting labels such as the 'rule of law', the
'welfare state' and, into the present, for example the 'enabling state'. This association has been
misleading in two ways: first, it suggests the false replacement of a 'previous' (eg the rule of
law') by a 'succeeding' model (eg the 'social' or 'welfare state'), in other words, the end of one
model and the beginning of the next. Such a depiction is misleading in that it overstates the
development of a maturing human rights awareness and codification/institutionalisation ‐ often
associated with the emergence of the welfare state ‐ by suggesting that the rule of law as a
label does not encompass such an understanding of human rights. What this table then
misrepresents is the irresolvable and creative tension between the models of the rule of law
and the welfare state (and the associated models of law and legal methodologies): this tension
is irresolvable because formal and substantive are two sides of law. The depiction of law as
either 'formal' or 'substantive' in association with the rule of law or the welfare state is thus not
an expression of historical progression, but is instead owed to the observation of which
understanding of law dominated (over the other) in relation to a particular model of the state.
What the labels depict, then, is less an objective reality of a particular type of state, but rather
the dominant understanding of a certain type of state and its law. As such, the table seeks to
capture the often polemical assertions of what kind of law is possible or impossible with regard
to a particular model of the state.
The other way, in which the table’s suggestion of models of law and state and respective
methodologies is misleading, concerns the invisibilisation of the self‐referential character of all
three columns. Instead of depicting a clean, historical succession of paradigms of state and law,
the table is meant to capture the present attempt, expressed in the third column, to make
sense of already existing and competing definitions of the state, its law and its method. As such,
the table recounts historically found, tentative assertions of the nexus between the state and
the law only to show how our present efforts of understanding this nexus are shaped by the
complex history of the association of different models of the state with evolving understandings
of law.
Law’s experimentation, captured in the third column of table 2, might be an adequate depiction
of law as parasite, of a law that has no proper method of its own and that which follows a wide‐
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ranging variety of demands. But law’s experimentation might also be the expression of law in
search of itself, of a law that cannot be sure of itself, its identity, its potential and foundations.
Its stubborn self‐reassertion, then, happens only from an ironical stance. Authority gained from
the state has become a fleeting reassurance at best, considering the diversification and
decentralisation of rule making and enforcement in modern states. Authority gained by an
appeal to a higher order is inevitably based on the belief in a functioning, validating and
legitimating process of interpretation, application and implementation. As such, issues of
authority become irreversibly tied to issues of distribution138, merging the ‘models’ of the rule
of law and the social/welfare state into a paradoxical concept, whose historical appearance is
merely contingent. It then becomes clear that what comes ‘after’ the welfare state might either
be the super‐welfare state or its demise, the neo‐liberal enabling state: as models, however,
they are but labels for a particular stage of institutional evolution. They say little if anything
about the law of the present.

IV. PLACES AND SPACES, WHITHER LAW?
With legal imagination haunted by images of a world of injustice, unequal distribution and
grave rights abuses139, the question becomes whether there is any room, role or even a need
for law in a globalised world. This question lies at the bottom of the current engagement of
lawyers with global governance issues. As identified in the preceding section, this inquiry
cannot be isolated from the struggle for law that has so far been identified with the state. The
central thesis of this paper is that this alleged crisis of law and legal regulation, whether
depicted as a loss of state sovereignty or as a problem of lacking (democratic, political)
accountability140 and legitimacy141, should instead be understood as a particular amplification
of a fundamental problem with law. In that respect, it can be shown that many of our present
concerns about the fate of law in relation to a continuing transformation of the state in relation
to contemporary forces or processes of globalisation or transnationalisation and resulting
contestations of democracy, legitimacy and accountability must be assessed against the
background of a reconstruction of legal evolution in the national, local context. Without
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suggesting that the legitimacy and regulatory challenges connected with the ‘amorphous’
concept of global governance142 are simple restatements or mirror reflections of locally
experienced moments of ‘exhaustion’143, there is a particular role to be played by local,
domestic regulatory experiences for the conceptualisation of global governance regimes. The
discussion focusing on the role of law occupies a particularly challenging place in this inquiry, in
particular because the rise of globalisation is so often associated with the demise of law144 and
with an immense pressure on law and legal institutions. Instead, globalisation can be
understood as an invitation to reflect on the connections between our attempts to make sense
of a fragmented global, normative order and our particular, yet anything but homogenous
experiences with law and regulation on the national level. In short, then, the argument is that
globalisation does not pose a first or a new advent of a ‘crisis’ of law, understood as a tool of
regulation. Instead, the varied history of law reveals the always inherent combination of hubris
and fragility, violence and vulnerability that underlies the idea and experience of law. This
becomes particularly clear where transnational efforts of ‘improving’ the legal conditions in
vulnerable contexts such as labour law have been encountering the need to develop a better
understanding of both the power dynamics at play between the norm‐exporting and the norm‐
receiving country and the differences in the regulatory framework on the ground.145
Moreover, while there is much to learn from studying law against the background of a
particular, national, historical context146, the transnational constellation further exacerbates
the scope of this inquiry. Much suggests that the particular nature of the transnational arena
142
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defeats our attempts at understanding the relation between the national and the ‘post‐national
constellation’147 as a linear one – either on a chronological or a systematic level.148 But, at the
same time, the evolving transnational nature of regulatory regimes as, for example, in
corporate law149 or, again, in labour law150, presents itself not as an opposition to or the
negation of the possibility of extending the reach of legal regulation, but as a challenge to
reassert the place and role of law in response to the thesis of law’s demise in an era of
globalisation. Reconceiving law as transnational suggests that domestic experiences with ‘law’
are crucial reference points. Yet, they cannot serve as reference points of institutional or
normative design, which we could simply ‘rediscover’ and amplify for a transposition into the
transnational arena. Instead, this approach must point towards two investigative strands. One
is that the inquiry into the evolution and, eventually, crisis of law as regulation of social activity
has to attempt the reconstruction as an ironic project that is concerned with the meaning and
aspiration of law as such: it is here where the positing of law is directly challenged by the
prospect of its impossibility, by its fundamental negation. This constellation can be grasped as
the relation or tension between law and non‐law, between legality and legitimacy, between law
and justice, society, or other.151 One strand of the ensuing inquiry is formed by the
reconstruction of local (eg national) experiences with law as constantly challenged by its
opposite or its foundations, embeddedness or contestations.152
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The second investigative strand is to return to the original starting point of our reflections of
how globalisation challenges law. In this dimension we are concerned with the task of
adequately incorporating or, perhaps only acknowledging, the gap between the particular
context in which norms and the normative environments have evolved locally on the one hand,
and the emerging, allegedly unruly spaces of normative order on the global level on the other.
As indicated before, a reflection on the field of transnational law, a notion which Jessup offered
in the 1950s to capture the hybrid regulatory space between the national and the
international153, should lead to its unfolding as a methodological device rather than to a
demarcation of a more or less definable legal field. Approaching transnational law from a
methodological perspective should help us to refrain from too quickly depicting the
‘transnational’ as a distinct regulatory space, which differs from the national and the
international because of its de‐territorialised scope and its hybrid, including mixed public‐
private, constitution. Instead, transnational law can be perceived as a particular perspective on
law as part of a society, which itself cannot sufficiently be captured by reference to national or
de‐nationalized boundaries.
This depiction most certainly echoes a systems‐theoretical understanding of a functionally
differentiated world society where law constitutes one among other particularly coded
communications. Intrigued by Luhmann, who in concluding his seminal treatise on the ‘law of
society’, famously questioned the survival of law in a global context154, other scholars in his
footsteps, by pointing to the normative evolutions occurring within emerging transnational
regulatory regimes, have been making a number of constructive suggestions to think ‘law
without the state’.155
Yet, it might be possible to push these advances even further. The attempts at understanding
transnational law as a methodological inquiry into the nature of norms reconnect this inquiry
with a longstanding investigation into the nature of law – and its contestations. The
transnational dimension, then, does not only arise with respect to territorial, or jurisdictional
confines, but also from the perspective of following the institutional modes of norm creation
deep into highly specialized areas of societal activity. It is here where the idea of transnational
law reveals its ambivalent relationship to the ‘old’ and the ‘new’: on the one hand,
transnational law appears to be embedded in and to be unfolding against the background of a
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state‐centred understanding of a legal order, while on the other hand, the concept is connected
to the longstanding and ever‐increasing experiences of normative pluralism that sit
uncomfortably with systematisations of law as necessarily connected to the state.156 From the
point of view of systems theory, these differentiated ‘areas’ are constituted in functionalist
terms: as the functional differentiation of society leads to a radical unfolding of society as world
society, the challenge for law consists in existing and operating in a simultaneous recognition
and disrespect vis‐à‐vis a known, sophisticated institutional and normative framework.157 The
current assertions, say, on this and that side of the Atlantic of a so‐called ‘global’ administrative
or ‘general public law’ speak volumes of this challenge.158
While this uncoupling of social systems from a state‐associated framework of political,
economic and legal order certainly presents a dramatic challenge to state‐centred theories of
law, its real gist in fact lies elsewhere. The – for lawyers – uneasy relationship between ‘society’
and ‘world society’, between the national and the global, that is the , transnational, should in
fact not be seen as a threat but instead as an element inherent to the constitution of legal
spaces. From this perspective, transnational refers to the ‘other’ of the law, which challenges
but simultaneously recognises its locally learned relations to concrete structures of
embeddedness, to particular experiences of historical evolution and contextual differentiation.
Transnational law, then, is a way of questioning and reconstructing the project of law between
places and spaces, where – in other words – places and spaces do not necessarily have to map
onto territorial or geographical sub‐strata or be divisble somehow into national or
international. This perspective raises hopes for a realization of the project of law, whereby law
would necessarily have to be understood as having a recoverable, revivable emancipatory
potential. But, what if that were not the case and questions of democratic governance would
attain an endlessly hollow sound in a globalised world?159 What if the fragility of law would win
the day, if law’s corruptibility would prevail over its absurdly stubborn insistence on its
existence, its very raison d’être?
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Again, the ‘outside’ perspective of globalisation proves surprisingly helpful in further
sharpening our investigative focus: the extremely unsure fate of social and political rights in
transnational spaces underscores the challenge that lawyers face in pursuing law as a critical
project in an increasingly integrated world.160 In the emerging global spaces of highly
specialized functional societal activities, both legal and political power have faired very
differently from economic power. The weakness of the former in relation to the long
undeterred success of the latter is reflected in the persistent absence of an effective global
legal‐political order. In this space, the transposition of legal instruments and concepts, which
were developed on the domestic level, onto the level of regulating cross‐border transactions –
both public and private161 – occurs as a translation exercise. Not only is the institutional
crystallization of the global space intimately interwoven into local structures while facilitating a
disembedded self‐regulatory, highly dynamic space, but the same tension between place and
space repeats itself with regard to the normative dimension.162

V. THINGS WE LOST?
The preceding observations point to an assessment of things we (allegedly) lost as a layered
account that is informed by a double perspective on legal memory. One story of loss is directly
linked to the difficulties of translating both institutions and concepts from the national to the
transnational level. This well‐known story, however, is quite misleading: it is misleading in the
sense that it renders invisibile the inherent fragility of law that has always been there and that
thus existed ‘before’ globalisation.163 The already noted laments concerning the alleged
erosions of sovereignty, of legal hierarchy and unity, of democracy and legitimacy, that are seen
in close connection to the state’s loss of regulatory ability in particular to govern transnational
activities, can now be read as a reversal of what has been a longstanding critical stance towards
law. The depiction of an allegedly external influence, sub verbo globalisation, which comes over
nation states to subdue national governments and political actors from the outside by
offsetting previously existing institutional and normative arrangements obscures the degree to
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which all such arrangements had always been contestable and fragile from the beginning.164
Reminding us of Martti Koskenniemi’s depiction of the reversal of emergency and normal in the
justificatory debates over the Kosovo intervention165, the image of globalisation as threat to the
sovereignty of the state and the unity of law washes over the highly contested grounds on
which the two have always been resting.166 In order to explore this contention further, the next
section briefly ties the current investigations about the fate of law in the transnational context
back to the critique levelled against the regulatory state during the 1970s and 1980s.

A. LAW AS NON‐LAW
Current research into the breathtaking development of transnational regulatory regimes
prompts intriguing parallels to previous inquiries into the driving forces of legal regulation, in
particular the development of ‘legal pluralism’ and ‘law and society’ in the 1970s and 1980s. For
one, legal pluralists and law and society scholars crucially contributed to a better understanding
of the ‘semi‐autonomous’ nature of legal fields: as pioneered in Sally Falk Moore’s analysis of
law in her 1976 article167, law is understood as constituted in part by social norms, routines,
customs and practices and in part by hard legal regulation. The ensuingnotion of law as a semi‐
autonomous field proved of vital importance in opening our eyes to the intricate relations
between the regulator and concrete, local, intimate social spaces.168 As well, striving for
alternatives to the at times heavy‐handed social engineering by the legal machinery, scholars
called for extra‐legal activism169 and delegalisation.170
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Such a growing understanding of the tensions between ‘lifeworld and system’171, ‘the raw and
the cooked’172, or ‘core and periphery’173 would soon become instrumental in the critical
assessment of the role of legal regulation in a highly pluralistic society during the middle of the
20th century, which until then had remained very much within the intellectual and conceptual
confines of Max Weber’s distinction between substantive and formal rationalities of law.174 In
his astute analysis of law’s evolution from substantive to formal rationality along with the
emergence of the bureaucratic rule of law, Weber had identified on the one hand the stabilizing
role of law for the conduct of commercial (and other) affairs, while, on the other, he had
emphasised the potentially harmful effects of ever‐recurring anti‐formal tendencies on the
body and practice of law.175 Weber’s sensibility to the contestations ‐‐ the anti‐rational,
material challenges ‐‐ to the aspiringly formal edifice of law176 turned out to foretel the ensuing
evolution of legal regulation well into the highly sophisticated regulatory architectures of
Western welfare states177, plagued by a purposive and intentional regulatory overdrive.178 It
comes as no surprise, then, that the reflection on the place of law in a canon of voices of social
170
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ordering that lawyers and social theorists in North America were concerned with179, was
somewhat echoed by the critique of ‘instrumental’ and ‘regulatory’ law in an overly zealous
welfare state apparatus in Western Europe.180
On both sides of the Atlantic, the responses to the financially and normatively exhausted
welfare state181 soon split into progressive182 and conservative183 camps. This context is worth
bearing in mind when assessing today’s academic and political proposals in the wake of the
financial crisis. In the context of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which saw a far‐reaching
crumbling of social‐democratic policy and a growing scepticism with Keynesian economics, a
fairly ambitious theoretical proposal was made that aimed at the resituating of law in a more
accentuated model of society: in this model, which did not lend itself to a straight‐forward
ideological appropriation, society is composed of intersecting, while separated,
communications that are each constituted by a distinct terminology (‘code’). Law was to be
understood as one of these social systems – along with the ‘economy’, with ‘politics’, ‘religion’,
or ‘art’.184 On this basis, the concept of ‘reflexive law’ was proposed as a form of law marked
above all by a crucial exposure to and immersion into its surrounding systems, while it
simultaneously remained ‘operationally’ closed. Due to its ‘cognitive’ openness, however, law
must constantly receive impulses (or ‘irritations’) and, relying on its autopoietic nature,
formulate legal responses ‐‐ ie continue its systematic operation – in the context of a constantly
changing environment. In the face of the weakening welfare state and the growing frustration
with ineffective, undemocratic, over‐generalizing and paternalising regulatory laws185, the
179
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concept of reflexive law was offered to explain the particular challenge and form of legal
regulation in a complex world. Its contested186 core consisted of understanding law as being
taken out of a learned institutional context made up of official institutions authoritatively
creating state‐originated laws and, instead, forced to reassert itself in highly diversified complex
environments. This radicalization of law’s functional orientation constituted a new stage in the
assessment of law’s institutional form, as it has been learned over time. Whereas law is still
today most often associated with the state, already the legal sociological work at the turn of
the century as well as the legal pluralist work since the 1960s and 1970s had long questioned
the law‐state nexus.

B. THE AMNESIA OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION
But, reflexive law came at a price, as its methodological orientation turned out to be highly
attractive to those who wanted to deconstruct the state in the interest of market liberalisation.
The turn away from the state and to the market at the end of the 20th century can be seen as
smartly employing the very methodological orientations that had informed the reconstructive
legal projects in the face of a financially and normatively exhausted welfare state187 in the
1980s. The fragile reconstructions of law through the concepts of responsive or reflexive law on
both sides of the Atlantic eventually fed into a large‐scale rejection of state ‘intervention’ all
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. When politically progressive scholars in the 1970s and 80s
had turned to alternative modes of legal regulation seeking to translate law’s generality into
contextual, learning‐oriented forms of socio‐legal regulation, they had hoped to save the
political ambitions of the welfare state, while continuing the socio‐political debate over the
substance and direction of political intervention.188 In contrast, both today’s neo‐formalism and
today’s neo‐functionalism threatens to cut the ties between the current quest to answer the
challenges of globalisation and the previous struggles over law and politics. Its proponents
characterise legal regulation as inappropriately policy‐driven and as undue infringement of the
societal actors’ capacity to regulate their own affairs autonomously.189 Boaventura de Sousa
186

Erhard Blankenburg, 'The Poverty of Evolutionism: a critique of Teubner's case for 'reflexive law'' (1984) 18 Law
& Society Rev 273‐289
187

Jürgen Habermas, 'The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies
[1985]' in Jürgen Habermas (ed) The New Conservatism Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate [ed and transl
by Shierry Weber Nicholsen] (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1989).
188

Rudolf Wiethölter, 'Social Science Models in Economic Law' in Terence Daintith and Gunther Teubner (eds),
Contract and Organisation Legal Analysis in the Light of Economic and Social Theory (Walter de Gruyter,
Berlin/New York 1986); Rudolf Wiethölter, 'Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law' in Gunther
Teubner (ed) Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York 1986)
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See, for example, Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, 'Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design' (2006) 115
Yale Law Journal 814‐879.
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Santos aptly captured this development in the following observation: “In a model based on
privatization, private initiative and market supremacy, the principles of order, reliability, and
trust cannot be commanded by the state. They can only come from the law and the judicial
system, as a set of independent and universal systems which create standard expectations and
resolve litigation through legal frameworks which are presumed to be understood by
everyone.”190
With the renaissance of neo‐formalism and neo‐functionalism, which have been characterising
legal policy in recent years, a heavy reliance on arguments of ‘necessity,’ of ‘objectivity’ and
‘naturalness’ came to prepare the ground for a functionalist interpretation and application of
legal norms in politically charged contexts experiencing fundamental shifts from public to
private regulation. The attack on contract adjudication and governmental ‘intervention’ that
accompanied these developments regularly rested on an understanding of the market as a‐
political, a‐historic and quasi‐natural.191 This depiction of the market and the state as separate
worlds formed troubling alliances with policy recommendations promoting the privatisation of
public services that were often fuelled by arguments of efficiency and cost reduction.192 Yet,
whether or not, and in which forms, private actors assume formerly public regulatory functions,
represents the outcome of political choices and of other socio‐economic developments at both
the national and transnational level.193 The allegedly available ‘fresh start’ for societal self‐
regulation without state interference –at least as it was widely perceived until the outbreak of
the 2007 financial crisis – stood in stark contrast to the observations made many decades ago,
that when market actors are enabled and empowered to exercise their private autonomy they
are exercising this freedom based on public deliberation and consensus.194
While there is considerable reason to believe, today, that we have entered a stage in the
assessment of state and market where we have to carefully turn our attention again to the long
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582‐606. “The system as a whole is dependent on an outside organization, an authoritarian state, made up also of
ignorant and frail human beings, to provide a setting in which it can operate at all.” Id.

192

For a critique, see Alfred C. Aman Jr., 'The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From
Government to Governance' (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 379‐400.
193

This led Philip Jessup to his capturing three dramas about constellations within and beyond the nation state
that involve parallel questions of democracy and participation. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (STORRS
LECTURES IN JURISPRUDENCE AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW HAVEN 1956).
194

Morris R. Cohen, 'Property and Sovereignty' (1927) 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 8‐30.

2010]

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM

41

and winding history of this relationship (between state and market)195, the identification of
starting points for a reconstructive project is far from obvious.196 As the treacherous
denationalisation197 of regulatory areas continues to pose tremendous conceptual problems for
state‐based theories of law, we must aim at combining our methodological inquiry into the
nature of transnational law with a bold reconstruction of critical perspectives from which to
discuss the need for ‘better’, ‘more efficient’, ‘tougher’ etc regulation, that is needed today in
the face of what continues to unfold as a dramatic financial and economic crisis.

C. TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE REGIMES AS CASES IN POINT OF POST‐REGULATORY LAW
As is evidenced for example by the case of corporate governance regulation, many of today’s
regulatory regimes are irreversibly transnational and hybrid in nature.198 While we continue to
study them through nationally oriented textbooks and case law, we soon learn how the rules
and instruments we are dealing with are products of a far‐reaching, fundamental
transformation of the regulatory landscape.199 As corporate law is being shaped by a complex
mix of public, private, state‐based and non‐state‐based norms, principles and rules, generated,
disseminated and monitored by a diverse set of actors200 and experts201, even the most casual
195

See eg, Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (Norton, New York & London
2009), Robert Skidelsky, Keynes. The Return of the Master (Allen Lane, London 2009) and Christian Marazzi, The
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Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford,
UK 2010), 181, 242‐247
199

Dan Danielsen, 'Local Rules and a Global Economy: An Economic Policy Perspective' (2010) 1 Transnational Legal
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look at today’s corporate governance debates reveals two important aspects. One is the way in
which the analysis of contemporary corporate governance regulation can help us become
sensitive to the emerging, new framework within which corporate governance rules are
evolving, a framework which is constituted by a combination of local and transnational actors
and norms, connected through ‘networks’ and migrating standards.202 As reflected in the
further expanding research on transnational regulatory areas203, the high degree of technicality
of the regulatory subjects and the crucial role of expert committees in drafting applicable
norms in considerable distance from formal legislative processes204 presents a formidable
challenge to traditional, regulatory theories of law.205
As we begin to understand the emerging regulatory frameworks in highly specialized areas as
an illustration of contemporary rule‐making, we can appreciate the legal pluralist
deconstruction of formal and informal legal orders in a new light. Building, on the one hand, on
early legal‐sociological work by Ehrlich (‘living law’) and Gurvitch (‘social law’), we are prompted
to revisit the core question of any sociology of law, namely how ‘to investigate the correlations
between law and other spheres of society.’206 Expanding the spectrum, on the other, with a

Gesetzgebungslehre im Kapitalmarktrecht. Vollharmonisierung, Generalklauseln und soft law im Rahmen des
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Peer Zumbansen, 'The Privatization of Corporate Law? Corporate Governance Codes and Commercial Self‐
Regulation' (2002b) Juridikum 136‐145
202
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view to legal pluralist work by scholars such as Moore207, Galanter208, Macaulay209, de Sousa
Santos210 or Teubner211, contemporary assessments of ‘hybrid legal spaces’212 that are not
sufficiently captured by references to local or national contexts, might help us understand
better the references to a distinctly transnational emergence of regulatory regimes. Again, this
identification of transnational allows us to study such regimes not as entirely detached from
national political and legal orders, but as emerging out of and reaching beyond them.213 As
alluded to before, the transnational dimension of new actors and newly emerging forms of
norms would be able to radicalize their ‘semi‐autonomous’ nature (Moore) in the following
way: we would conceive of regulatory spaces as being marked by a dynamic and often
problematically instrumentalized tension between formal and informal norm‐making processes.
But, in contrast to the ever‐refining sociological perspective on this evolving transnational
regulatory landscape, the question of politics must continue to linger painfully.214 Again, an
example taken from the corporate law context may serve as an illustration. The much
lamented, regulatory ‘failure’ of traditional, state‐based legal‐political intervention into
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multinational corporations (MNC) has long served as an argument for the need to develop
either distinctly ‘post‐national’, institutionalized governance forms or to further strengthen the
grip of self‐regulatory and soft instruments with only voluntary binding nature.215 Mirroring the
complex, hard‐to‐navigate landscape of border‐crossing corporate activity, the proposed
conceptual approaches vary greatly as to their reliance on self‐regulation, market‐based
reputational enforcement and traditional statutory intervention. Constituting anything but a
coherent set of applicable approaches to corporate regulation, they range from references to
‘global jurisdiction’216, to the reconceptualisation of ‘torture as tort’ and the elaboration of
transnational civil human rights litigation.217 Closely connected hereto, there have been wide‐
ranging efforts to further build on scandalization instruments that include global shaming.218
Finally, the increased if not resigned reliance on soft law instruments, self‐binding norms, and
codes of conduct and best practice219, altogether suggests an irreversible trend away from
‘government’ to ‘governance’.220
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As transnational governance regimes, then, fields such as corporate governance, labour law221,
capital market law, contract law in general and consumer protection law in particular222 are
increasingly marked by the existence of opt‐out clauses and self‐regulation mechanisms rather
than by enforceable hard‐law rules.223 Does this mean, that the legal pluralist depiction of
regulatory spheres as ‘semi‐autonomous fields’224 would no longer be able to provide a
sufficient starting point for a more comprehensive critique of the existing machinery of
justice?225 Does the radical fragmentation of transnational law today imply that the original
legal pluralist sword is too dull to cut through the distinctly post‐national constellation of
regulatory regimes? The opposite is true: legal pluralism can forcefully build on its learned
lessons in the aftermath times of the decaying welfare state and ‘legal centralism’. While not
being able to directly translate the insights gained in those contexts onto the transnational
sphere, they can nevertheless assist in depicting the multifaceted nature of transnational
governance. This becomes particularly evident where, in a context such asan evolving political
governance system such as in Europe, claims about ‘private autonomy’ and ‘market freedom’
are advanced226 that seem to echo many of the previous contestations of market intervention
and judicial activism within the nation state.227 Our renewed interest in different meanings of
221
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embedded markets is of crucial importance at a time when the financialist paradigm seems to
have outrun itself and where, in our search for a new basis and framework for public policy228 in
a highly interconnected transnational regulatory, post Welfare‐state era, we cannot simply
return to ‘more state, less market’ formulas. The crucial contribution of a legal pluralist analysis
lies in its rendering the boundaries between the state and the market qualititative rather than
quantitative. The central question is not whether there is a need for more or less state (or
market), but rather what is at stake in making references to either?
The following Table 3 picks up this line of thought and ties it back to the narrative of loss (of
legal unity, certainty and hierarchy) that we encountered at the beginning of this article. While
the idea of loss only makes sense when we both idealise and immunise law in the nation state
against its inherent ‘other’, the consequence of realising that we must think of law as the
inseparability of law/non‐law is a breaking down of the horizontal boundaries between
‘national’ and ‘global’ law. Just as the boundary between law and non‐law emerges as
paradoxical, the dividing line between the national and the global is not one governed by
jurisdiction. It is, instead, one that relies on a critical reconstruction of the project of law – and,
as noted earlier, we embrace “transnational law” as a methodological project on the very
nature of normativity generally and law more particularly. The much alleged impossibility of law
on a global scale must become the invitation to revitalize the legal pluralist project of
questioning what is at stake when we differentiate between law and non‐law. This is the
defining inquiry into the nature of transnational governance.
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Table 3: Law as Non‐Law – Transnational Legal Pluralism
LAW
NATIONAL

NON‐LAW

• Sociology of law
• Legal pluralism

Legal unity
Institutionalised change of law
(Consumer Law, Employment Law,
Constitutional Law)
Hierarchy of norms
Separation of powers

P
A
R
A
D
O
X

• Deconstruction of (formal) Law
• Law’s ‘other’
• The not‐yet law as critique of existing law
• ‘Social norms’
Non‐law as alternative

Access to justice
Due process

GLOBAL

¾Quasi‐political,

Transnational Legal Pluralism

quasi‐public regulatory agencies

Le-

¾Calls for a just global order
¾ Search for post‐national

gi-

legitimacy

tima-

¾Global civil society

¾ Transnational publics

¾ ‘Generations’ of human rights
¾ ‘Global Administrative Law’
¾‘Transnational Labor Citizenship’

cy

VI. The Argument for Transnational Legal Pluralism
As Saskia Sassen has recently reiterated, both dryly and irrefutably, there is an intimate
connection between the search for and the critique of law and the nation state.229 Her
observation is particularly astute as Sassen has, over the years230, much contributed to our
better understanding of how the allegedly external, victimising state of ‘globalisation’ is
229
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distinctly co‐evolving with and produced, constructed and conceived within the ‘national’.
Instead of positing globalisation as a process, event or development that comes over nation
states, national economies and domestic political processes to haunt, discipline and submerge,
Sassen’s depiction – like Sousa Santos’231 – points back to the nation state and to sub‐national
spheres of societal activity and decision‐making. It is within these spheres that elements of
physical and intellectual texture emerge that coalesce to produce border‐crossing ‘global
assemblages’. These constitute distinct spheres that, famously fuelled by, inter alia, the
dramatic development of information technology and other ‘transnational social and cultural
practices’ such as human rights, nationality and residence rights as well as intellectual property
rights232, integrate territorial and de‐territorial, vertical and horizontal ordering patterns to
produce a structured regime of societal activities.233
Sassen’s concept of ‘global assemblages’ constitutes a fruitful contribution to our
understanding of globalisation as a challenge to study the dramatic transformation of
institutional and semantic structures in an era of intensifying transnational communication and
governance regimes.
Sassen’s idea of global assemblages allows us to structure the sphere between the national and
the international/global that has been plaguing legal imagination for some time now.234 Her
main contribution can be seen in her unerring commitment to simultaneously emphasise and
relativise the national in the emerging cartography of a globalised world. Sassen’s emphasis on
the national and sub‐national, viz. local, processes and institutions goes a long way toward
allowing us to identify the concrete places at which decisions that result in globalisation
phenomena are prepared, taken and implemented. Her work on global cities is of particular
relevance in this regard. Here, Sassen has been arguing convincingly that global cities gain
autonomy from their local environments both by adapting real‐time collaborative and
networking capacities with other cities and operative centres and by successfully demanding
and implementing a facilitating, supportive infrastructure (electricity, broadband, digitisation,
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24/7 service, access and maintenance).235 At the same time, to Sassen, the depiction of the
particular ‘embeddedness’ of the global city in a local environment only makes sense in
connection with an appreciation of the particular spaces that open up in and between these
concrete cities as places. Highlighting, in particular, the crucial role played by the breathtaking
advances in information technology that fuel the space‐time compression through real‐time
collaboration, connection, and linking of formerly distant places, actors and centres, Sassen,
then and now236, recognises the central challenge that these changes place on the
“effectiveness of current framings for state authority and democratic participation.”237 Spaces
in Sassen’s understanding, then, are not to be mistaken with territorially or geographically
defined ‘areas’, but constitute much more ambiguous realms that are constituted through
societal interaction as well as through intellectual construction. Examples include ‘global cities
and transboundary publics’238 but also global capital markets239, which illustrate how the triad
of ‘territory, authority, rights’ is inescapably subjected to increasingly denationalised processes
of deassembling and reassembling.240
The relativisation of the national basis of globalisation in Sassen’s work proceeds in relation to
the well‐known institutions, reference points and established procedures such as states,
parliaments, administrative agencies and, importantly, courts. Those have long structured the
economic, political and legal order and are now struggling to re‐assert their previously held
roles and positions of power.241 This – relative – relativisation of the national feeds into the
235
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formation of a newly emerging spatial category: the focus on space promises to capture more
adequately the way in which our understanding of regulatory landscapes as well as of scopes of
human interactions still reckons with concretely identifiable places of legal and political
regulation while at the same time reaching beyond it. While the latter is aptly depicted in both
Sassen’s and de Sousa Santos’ analysis of the interaction between the national and the global,
the former has been given a powerful expression by David Levi‐Faur’s concept of ‘regulatory
capitalism’.242 This constellation presents tremendous challenges to both an analytical and
prescriptive framework that was developed with reference to a more or less well defined,
territorially confined and institutionally closely‐knit regulatory framework.243 To be sure, one
challenge of this embrace of space consists in developing an appropriate language with which
to communicate about the institutional and normative challenges in a world that cannot
effectively be governed through domestic and domestically minded rules.244 The other
challenge arises from the intricate nature of the spaces unfolding in the transnational realm.
Part of the reason for the Washington Consensus’ effectiveness in streamlining – literally on a
global scale – regulatory politics, has to be seen in the particular connections and
interdependencies that were created between, say, corporate, tax, labour, financial and social
regulation. Bound to upset and to undermine fragile balances between different social
interests, the deregulation of corporate, commercial and financial activity gave rise to an
overwhelming amount of new regulatory institutions and instruments245, all the while
promoting a principle of ‘good governance’ marked by minimum state intervention into
allegedly self‐regulating markets. Among the primary victims, surely, was and remains labour,
as regards both the differently institutionalised forms of workers’ protection, industrial
relations and collective bargaining and the sobering erosions of basically all forms of
employment security. A far cry from Polanyi’s succinct critique of Speenhamland246 and
242

David Levi‐Faur, 'The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism' (2005) 598 The Annals of The American
Academy of Political and Social Science 12‐29; see also John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism. How it Works,
Ideas for Making it Work Better (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK 2008).
243

Saskia Sassen, 'Globalization or denationalization?' (2003) 10 Review of International Political Economy 1‐22, 7:
“Older hierarchies of scale constituted as part of the development of the nation‐state, continue to operate, but
they do so in a far less exclusive field than they did in the recent past.“

244

See already Rudolf Wiethölter, 'Begriffs‐ oder Interessenjurisprudenz ‐ falsche Fronten im IPR und
Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht' in Alexander Lüderitz and Jochen Schröder (eds), Internationales Privatrecht und
Rechtsvergleichung im Ausgang des 20 Jahrhunderts (Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt 1977).
245

David Levi‐Faur, 'The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism' (2005) 598 The Annals of The American
Academy of Political and Social Science 12‐29, 15: “Moreover, new regulatory institutions, technologies, and
practices are increasingly embedded in the crowded and complex administrative structures of modern capitalist
nation‐states.” See also id., at 19: “…regulation is helping to legitimize markets and facilitate transactions by
enhancing trust.”
246

Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Beacon Press, Boston
1944).

2010]

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM

51

Arendt’s meditations on the transformation of the worker into a political actor247, the rise of
the ‘precariat’248 has been accompanied by an across‐the‐board undermining of both
institutional and individual frameworks of workers’ rights.249 Conceptual approaches such as
democratic experimentalism250, regulatory capitalism or transnational labour citizenship251
constitute attempts towards the development of an appropriately designed framework of legal
analysis and regulation in light of a radically disembedded regulatory landscape.
The above can be seen as one of many more present examples that illustrate how the
specifically European Post‐Westphalian legal perspective, which predominantly rested on an
understanding of a hierarchically structured system of order,252 has, within the confines of the
nation‐state and later in light of a fast‐proliferating realm of border‐crossing hybrid regulatory
activity, been put on the defensive. Much in the present discussions about the fate of law in an
era of globalisation is oriented around the form, nature and quality of a global legal order.253
Yet, as captured in Table 3, such investigations remain for the most part confined to an analysis
on the left hand side of the matrix, namely to an exercise in contrasting the presently perceived
absence of reliable legal institutions and instruments on the global scale with an allegedly
perished state of legal certainty, hierarchy of norms and the unity of law within the nation‐
state. It is only when we care to remember the description of the legal order from a legal
pluralist point of view that the fundamental fragility of the supposedly stable and unified legal
system becomes again apparent. Once we revisit the pluralist contestation of law’s exclusivity
and its alleged hierarchical supremacy within the nation state, we begin to see the transition
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from a nation state‐based understanding of law towards one of ‘global law’ as a continuation –
rather than as a loss ‐‐ of a theoretical investigation into the meaning of law and legal ordering.
It is this perspective that should drive lawyers’ interest in the present musings about ‘space’.
The lawyer struggling to understand the fate of her field in a world of transition from national
to global is bound to engage in a both methodological and theoretical inquiry. It is
methodological in the sense that legal concepts are competing with alternative disciplinary
approaches to effectively address the regulatory challenges and goals arising from ‘global
governance’. It is theoretical in the sense that the widely observable proliferation of norm
creation and norm administration in numerous areas of what legal scholars and political
scientists have been coining ‘private transnational regulation’254 prompts a revisiting of the
‘concept’ of law. But, in addition, the claims laid to this space are fiercely driven by political,
religious, cultural and ‘social’ critique. What is at stake in fact is less an answer to the question
whether or not the norms in question are law. Such questions were relatively easily posed—
and answered—in the context of the fairly differentiated legal systems of Western welfare
states, in which distinctions between public and private ordering could usually be drawn by
reference either to the larger societal interest in question or to the institutional affiliation of the
norm’s author, in other words the ‘authority’ of the norm entrepreneur. In the transnational
space, this institutional framework is being fundamentally reshaped. The constitutional order,
on the basis of which it was possible in Western nation states to constantly scrutinise and
redraw the boundaries between public and private regulatory activity, is largely absent in the
transnational space. Instead, process‐oriented principles such as accountability and
transparency are mobilised and implemented in a vast array of transnational norm creations in
order to fill this void. At the heart of such attempts—as in the ‘Global Administrative Law’
project—is the struggle over a new foundation of legitimacy. Again, moving out of the highly
regulated space of the nation state, the struggle over legitimacy becomes one of deep‐running
conflicts and the various competing attempts to solve them. As such, for lawyers and their field,
the reference to ‘space’ is first and foremost a reminder of the fragility of their conceptual
framework and their regulatory instruments.
What, then, follows from this constellation for the lawyer and legal theory? Included in the
resulting task for the lawyer in his/her quest to reassess the nature of global legal regulation is
the need to scrutinise and explore both the obvious and not so obvious differences between
law and competing regulatory approaches that are on offer in a globalising world, for example,
from economics, religion, or ‘culture’. The lawyer will tend to distinguish her project from those
competitors in both formal and substantive dimensions. As regards form, the primary mark of
distinction that she will resort to is hierarchy, for what sustains the typical lawyer is the belief in
a system of social order that is built on a model of legitimate authorisation, based on which are
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rules of norm creation, implementation and enforcement.255 In terms of substance, the
demarcation between law and alternative forms of social order can be drawn with reference to
the centrality of ‘justice’ to the legal system. Yet, it soon becomes clear that the self‐
referentiality of justice in the legal system256 is echoed and paralleled by similar, even if
differently called, self‐references in other systems. Law’s claim to be the sole guardian of really
any concept of justice, in other words of justice ‘per se’, cannot in the end escape its
deconstruction as pure semantics.
Law’s relativisation, then, in the concert of differently conceived ‘governance’ models, is a
sobering prospect. At the same time, it is one that seems distressingly compatible with the
long‐time triumphant neo‐liberal assertions of law’s role in facilitating global market activity
and universal freedom – from, say, state intervention. If law were really not more than a
different label for ‘good governance’, it would indeed have little if anything to add to the
current investigations into the consequences of globalisation. That is why the lower right hand
corner of the matrix in Table 3 becomes an important final step in the attempt to picture the
nature and the fate of law in our time. This part of the matrix depicts the global illustrations of
the contestation of legal order and of its claims to supremacy, hierarchy, unity and universality.
The decisive step in making sense of the matrix now is to ask how the inherently contestable,
amorphous, incoherent and not fully articulable principles, rules and instruments that emerge
here can at all turn into law. In other words, how can concepts such as ‘transnational labour
citizenship’, ‘global civil society’ or ‘global administrative law’ become integral components of a
global order, which we would justly refer to as a legal order?
The answer lies in the connection between the upper and the lower parts of the right‐hand
column of the matrix. For, on the level of the nation state, we saw the dissolution of the vertical
boundary between ‘law’ and ‘nonlaw’ as a result of understanding that none of the principles,
rules, instruments or institutions associated with law (the upper left hand side of the matrix)
would exist without the ‘other’, without the contestation, constant undermining and challenge
of the existing system of ‘law’. Two steps remain: one is that when we apply this logic to the
lower side of the matrix through which we try to depict the ‘global’ scale of law, then it
becomes apparent that the vertical boundary between ‘law’ and ‘nonlaw’ must cease, as it, too,
is a misrepresentation of the reciprocal interdependency of the right and the left sides of the
divide. Indeed, the very fluid character of emerging global ‘legal’ institutions must occur in face
of the fundamental challenge and contestation of all that is not or not yet law.
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The last step: now with the dividing line between ‘law’ and ‘nonlaw’ on both the national and
the global level revealed as a paradoxical boundary between two opposites which can neither
be separated nor become one, we are left with the remaining divider between the national and
the global. The nature of that divide has itself, however, become deeply questionable as well.
One of its main justifications, namely law’s close association with the state, has been
challenged to the degree that legal pluralism has opened our eyes to a host of normative orders
and contexts of legal ordering with forms of institutionalisation that do not fit into the dualist
model of state and society. Moreover, legal fields that lawyers had identified and scrutinised
within the confines of the nation state, have been – in following the logic of the societal areas
prompting legal regulation – burgeoning ‘outward’, as it were, driven by the claim to ‘extend’
their regulatory reach to border‐crossing and, indeed, global events and activities. But, with law
following the rationality of societal differentation, the image of law’s outbound journey into a
world of global meaning is misleading. This journey could just as well be described as an
inbound one, as an exploration that unfolds along the extremely fine capillaries of a convulsing
body of society into its deepest inner parts and, there, asserts its logic of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’. In
light of influential images of a ‘shrinking world’257, globally spanning migration flows258, media
coverage of formerly distant events and concerns259 and a deafening expansion of a global
culture260, it is often perceived that the law has in fact been under pressure to travel ‘beyond’
the boundaries of the nation state, to assert and to regain its regulatory power in an otherwise
unruly global world. And in fact, developments under the label of legal globalisation have taken
on a wide range of forms, from local courts claiming ‘universal’ jurisdiction261 to the
development of behaviour‐guiding norms in the forms of codes of conduct, best practice
guidelines or recommendations, which can themselves no longer be conceived of as either
public or private, national or international law.
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It is this diffusion of normative orders in the form of proliferating norm producers and
enforcement schemes that seriously calls into question the dividing line between a national and
a global level of law making. Indeed, as mentioned above, many of today’s regulatory regimes
combine public and private, direct and indirect forms of norm creation and administration.
These ‘transnational law regimes’262 emerge, on the one hand, through actors who derive their
law making power not necessarily or exclusively from politically and formally institutionalised
hierarchies but increasingly from self‐legitimating, issue or problem‐area driven processes of
norm production and from a global flow of normative principles, institutional initiatives,
‘migrating principles’263 and norms, on the other.
The central argument to be made here is that we must conceive of this transformation and
erosion of the vertical (law/nonlaw) and horizontal (national/global) boundaries as a
methodological inquiry into the way in which spaces of legal order are being defined. The legal
pluralist project of the 20th century in many ways opened the door to a harsh, often very
empirically based, critique of the shortcomings and blindspots of existing, formally
institutionalised legal cultures. The legal pluralists pushed for a theorisation that involved
applying legal sociological insights gained in foreign, often indigenous, legal cultures to
domestic rule of law systems, eventually paving the way for a tremendously rich series of
investigations into the inner and outer worlds of different legal cultures.264 The present state of
research on ‘law and globalisation’ suggests that the demarcation of national and global forms
of law today is as much a methodological (and critical enterprise) as the legal pluralist
deconstruction of legal hierarchy and unity of law was then.
Transnational law is another name for transnational legal pluralism, for an – inherently
interdisciplinary – inquiry into the nature of legal regulation of problems, which have long been
extending beyond the confines of jurisdiction – both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the nation state265
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‐‐ and which have always been at the heart of the socio‐legal orientation of the legal pluralist
inquiry into the myriad contexts, forms and dynamics of norm creation.266 But, as the
transnational legal pluralist project takes seriously the functional differentiation of a society in
search of its law, it is bound to suggest and to explore connections between the law/nonlaw
collisions then and now, and between those here and those ‘out there’. And so, in trying to
make sense of the changing frameworks of legal regulation for global human conduct and
societal development, the transnational legal pluralist is bound to revisit former instances of
legal realism, anti‐formalism, functionalism, deconstruction and ‘political legal theory’. But, the
insights and lessons to be gained from this reconstruction are both limited and risky. Too often
will the learned understandings of ‘rights’, of hierarchy or equality make the pluralist blind to
the particular dynamics that govern a normative field.267 In response, transnational legal
pluralism as a methodology implies a radical unfolding of the tension between the four
different parts of the matrix. The law of a highly differentiated world society can neither be
based on the rigid separation of law and nonlaw nor on a distinction between national and
global. Instead, the transnational legal pluralist project highlights the evolution of legal
categories that can generate order under circumstances where the traditional institutional
framework and reference sets have to be seen as contingent. Such an evolution is part of a
process of contending forces and dynamics with unpredictable outcomes. Existing and
emerging research on regulatory regimes and regulatory governance as umbrella concepts for
an interdisciplinary approach to the study of law and regulation points to the need to better
connect seemingly disparate research and policy agendas. There are important parallels, say,
between the legal pluralist critique of regulatory law on the one hand and the investigations in
economic sociology into the evolving nature of the embeddedness of markets. 268
Other parallels exist between the progressive methodological orientation of
responsive/reflexive law in the 1970s and 1980s and ‘cosmopolitanism’ today269 on the one
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hand, and the recent, politically much more ambivalent interest in ‘social norms’ on the
other.270 For each of these inquiries, a first task consists in continuing or opening and pursuing
dialogues between law and economics, law and sociology, law and anthropology, law and
political economy. A second task consists in effectively connecting the domestically unfolded
critique of law under various guises – notably, that of legal realism, critical legal studies, law
and economics, feminist legal studies or critical race theory, postcolonialism or Third World
Approaches to International Law [TWAIL], of responsive, reflexive law, as well as social norms –
with, say, current debates around global governance, ‘global administrative law’, regulatory
networks or transnational law. While we are not coming to such analysis without baggage, the
challenge remains how to best apply the things learned and the things discovered in face of an
extremely pluralistic and contested landscape. Beginning with neither taking law for granted
nor mourning its death might provide a promising starting point for an analysis of legal
regulation and its alternatives in a changing world.
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